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Abstract 
 
The efficient market hypothesis has been considered one of the most controversial arguments in 
finance, with the academia divided between who claims the impossibility of beating the market and 
who believes that it is possible to gain over the average profits. If the hypothesis holds, it means, as 
suggested by Burton Malkiel, that a blindfolded monkey selecting stocks by throwing darts at a 
newspaper's financial pages could perform as well as a financial analyst, or even better. In this paper 
we use a novel approach, based on confidence intervals for proportions, to assess the degree of 
inefficiency in the S&P 500 Index components concluding that several stocks are inefficient: we 
estimated the proportion of inefficient stocks in the index to be between the 12.13% and the 27.87%. 
This supports other studies proving that a financial analyst, probably, is a better investor than a 
blindfolded monkey. 
Keywords: Confidence interval; Efficient market hypothesis; Informational efficiency; Random 
walk; Runs test; Variance ratio. 
1. Introduction 
 
The efficient market hypothesis has been considered one of the most controversial arguments in 
finance, with the academia divided between who claims the impossibility of beating the market and 
who believes that it is possible to gain over the average profits. The amount of empirical studies 
produced on the issue is extraordinary and trying to assess the problem with originality is a difficult 
task. However, in this paper we propose a new approach to test the degree of inefficiency of the stock 
 
1 This is an old and INCOMPLETE version of the paper; the published version on Physica A can be found at 
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market providing new interesting results supporting the existence of inefficiencies.   
    The random walk model, which is probably the most versatile model for empirical validation of 
the EMH, states that in a security’s price series, all subsequent price changes are random departures 
from past prices (Malkiel, 2003). If information is immediately reflected in stock prices, therefore 
information today cannot be used to predict prices tomorrow and the path of price changes will be 
completely random and unpredictable. Using a vivid image suggested by Burton Malkiel (1973) “it 
means that a blindfolded monkey throwing darts at a newspaper's financial pages could select a 
portfolio that would do just as well as one carefully selected by the experts”. The irreverent image of 
Burton Malkiel seems a joke but was taken seriously by the San Francisco Chronicle. This curious 
anecdote (Mishkin and Eakins, 2012, p. 127) shows perfectly the meaning of the efficient market 
model: it was asked to eight analysts to pick five stocks at the beginning of the year and then their 
results were compared with those obtained by the stocks chosen by Jolyn, an orangutan. Surprisingly 
(or maybe not), Jolyn beat the analysts as often as they beat her. This is not, of course, a scientific 
way to test the model, but such absurdities are not infrequent in financial markets.     
    We should warn the reader that the approach followed in this study is intentionally very 
conservative, since the supporters of stock markets efficiency have provided strong proofs of their 
claims. Nevertheless, our strong and prudent statistical framework consents us to affirm that some 
degree of inefficiency is still present, at least in the U.S. stock markets. We conclude therefore that 
for many assets the weak form of the efficient market hypothesis is rejected.   
    The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the notion of market efficiency and presents 
the main empirical literature. Section 3 presents the adopted methodology and results. The final 
section concludes. 
2. A brief review of previous studies on the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Informational efficiency is the situation that characterizes a market where prices fully reflect all 
available information. The Nasdaq glossary defines informational efficiency as: “The degree to which 
market prices correctly and quickly reflect information and thus the true value of an underlying 
asset.2”. The most diffused expression to indicate this condition is “efficient market hypothesis” 
(EMH). This kind of definition is, in most of cases, split into three different degrees of efficiency: 
weak, semi-strong and strong form. This categorization is useful because consents us to test the degree 
of informational efficiency from the lowest one to the highest one. The classic definitions of the three 
forms are: 
1. weak form: past prices are already incorporated into current prices; therefore, they cannot 
be used to gain excess returns (if this form holds, technical analysis is completely useless); 
2. semi-strong form: security prices adjust to publicly available information (such as annual 
reports, new security issues etc.) very rapidly to reflect also these information (if this form 
holds, fundamental analysis becomes almost useless); 
3. strong form: a market where prices reflect all kind of information, public and private, so 
that is impossible to earn excess returns. 
The strong form incorporates the other two whereas the semi-strong form incorporates the weak form. 
One way to test the degree of informational efficiency is to test whether stock market analysis is 
capable to ensure above the average profits. The two basic approaches to invest in stock markets are 
technical analysis and fundamental analysis.  
    Technical analysis is based essentially on the study of stocks’ charts, for this reason the supporters 
are called chartists. This methodology is grounded in the “castle-in-the-air theory” (Malkiel, 1973): 
it is possible to understand better market dynamics using psychological factors instead than the 
“intrinsic value” of a firm, studying the behaviour of investors and trying to predict it. The basic idea 
is that in good times investors tend to be optimistic (they build castles in the air) whereas in bad times 
they are pessimistic; this is reflected by the path of a stock price, so the analysis of trends can reveal 
precious information over its future evolution. Edwards and Magee (1948) said that “Prices move in 
trends, and trends tend to continue until something happens to change the supply-demand balance"; 
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for chartists it is possible to use past information to make successful predictions. The intuition behind 
the idea of Edwards and Magee was in some sort of sense comparable with the one proposed by 
Mandelbrot (1963, p. 418), who observed that “large changes tend to be followed by large changes—
of either sign—and small changes tend to be followed by small changes’’, a phenomenon known as 
volatility clustering. In truth, this approach may have a sense especially in the case of self-fulfilling 
prophecies, a direct consequence of herd behaviour. Suppose that a sentiment or a news, even 
completely unjustified, spreads in the market, if enough traders will believe it, they will cause with 
their actions the prevented result. A trader able to anticipate these situations can outperform the 
market.  
    The second paradigm is called fundamental analysis because the analyst tries to evaluate the real 
value of a stock, called intrinsic value, and then compare this value with the market value to 
understand if it is overvalued, undervalued or correctly valued by the market. This methodology is 
grounded in the “firm-foundation theory” (Malkiel, 1973), i.e. it uses information relative to the firm 
(e.g. dividends payments, annual or infra-annual reports, strategic decision announcements etc.) to 
estimate the evolution of its cash flows over a given period and then actualize them to correctly value 
the stock. If, for instance, the stock is undervalued the analyst will buy it before the market will adjust 
its price, so that when the price will go up, she can sell the stock and gain the differential.   
    It is clear now why the weak form of EMH is destructive for technical analysis whereas the semi-
strong for the fundamental analysis: in the first case, information from past prices is useless to 
outperform the market since it is already reflected in present prices; in the second case, if prices adapt 
rapidly to public information, the computation of a fundamental value become a worthless exercise 
since the market is already evaluating the stock price correctly. Fama (1965a) shows how the random 
walk model presents important challenges to the followers of both technical analysis and fundamental 
analysis. 
    Some evidences seem to support the EMH, for example, it has been showed in several works 
(Jensen, 1968; Malkiel, 1995) that mutual funds have not been able to outperform the market.  Other 
studies (Ball and Brown, 1968; Fama et al., 1969) showed that, coherently with the semi-strong form, 
positive announcements about a company do not produce, on average, an increase in the price of its 
stock because this information is already incorporated in the stock price. Fama et al. (1969) concluded 
that the stock market is efficient with respect to its ability to adjust to the information implicit in a 
stock split using the method of residuals analysis. Scholes (1969) used the same method on a sample 
of 696 new issues of common stock during the period 1926-1966 to provide further evidence in favour 
of the semi-strong form efficiency. Several works have tested the overall performance of technical 
analysis showing that it is not able to outperform the market (Alexander, 1961; Allen F. and 
Karjalainen, 1999).  
    Evidences against the EMH have gained popularity in recent years, among these we have the small 
firm effect, that occurs when small firms can earn abnormal returns over long periods of time 
(Reinganum, 1983). Various explanations have been made referring to tax issues, large information 
costs related to the valuation of small firms or low liquidity of their stocks, but the existence of the 
phenomenon is in contradiction with the EMH.   
    One of the better-known anomalies in stock markets is the so-called January effect, i.e. the fact 
that stock prices have tended to show a consistent price increase from December to January, making 
this phenomenon predictable and hence contradicting the random walk hypothesis. The amount of 
studies concerned with this anomaly is remarkable (Reinganum, 1983; Chan, 1986; Thaler, 1987; 
Eakins and Sewell, 1993) and many authors explain the phenomenon principally using tax 
considerations. Investors tend to sell stocks in December because they can then take capital losses on 
their tax return and reduce their tax liability. In January, they can repurchase the stocks, raising up 
their prices and producing higher returns. This theory seems reasonable but does not explain why 
institutional investors, that are income tax-free, do not take advantage of the higher returns in January 
buying stocks in December, causing an increase in those prices and absorbing the anomalous returns. 
    Other anomalies that seem to contradict the EMH are the stickiness in pricing errors correction 
after news announcements (market overreaction; see, for example, De Bondt and Thaler, 1987 or 
Chopra et al., 1992) and the related phenomenon of fluctuations in stock prices much greater than 
fluctuations in their fundamental value (excess volatility; see, for example, Shiller, 1981). Among the 
others, LeRoy and Porter (1981) pointed out that stock markets show excess volatility and they 
rejected market efficiency.  
    Even if it is controversial, mean reversion of stock returns is another feature of financial markets 
which falsifies the assumptions of the EMH. Summarily, stock returns exhibit the tendency to return 
to their means through time thus making their movements partly predictable in contrast to the random 
walk model of stock prices (for a summary, see Engel and Morris, 1991). As noted by Peron and 
Vodounou (2005), a common conclusion is that the EMH is rejected when using long horizon returns 
(generally 3 to 10 years), which implies a mean-reverting behaviour for prices.  
    Keim and Stambaugh (1986) found statistically significant predictability in stock prices by using 
forecasts based on certain predetermined variables. Lo and MacKinlay (1988) rejected the random 
walk hypothesis for weekly stock market returns using the variance ratio test, furthermore, also 
Jegadeesh (1990) provided strong evidence in favour of predictability of securities returns.   
    The strong form efficiency seems to be more theoretical than realistic. Niederhoffer and Osborne 
(1966) found that specialists on the N.Y.S.E. (from now on, NYSE) apparently use their monopolistic 
access to information. Scholes (1969) evidenced that officers may have monopolistic access to 
information about their corporations and even Fama (1970) warned about the unrealistic feasibility 
of this extreme hypothesis; furthermore, real cases seems to falsify the EMH in its strong form (for 
example, the case of Ivan Boesky and the insider trading scandal which involved him).  
    A great challenge for the EMH is represented by the existence of speculative bubbles: with this 
term we indicate a situation of a great discrepancy between the true value of a stock and its current 
market value. If markets are informationally efficient, stock price should always reflect the real value 
of that security because of the rational expectation assumption. This phenomenon can assume 
catastrophic proportions, as happened with the Dot-com Bubble, when the euphoric hunger of 
investors pushed up the stock prices of internet-based company far beyond any realistic 
considerations. In this case the EMH fails to provide a better explanation than behavioural finance: 
cognitive bias and behavioural parameters seem to be the main drivers of such phenomena. 
3. Measuring the level of informational efficiency of the U.S. stock market  
3.1 Data and methodology 
Our study focuses on the U.S. stock market, because of its relevance, and consists of several tests to 
measure the level of informational efficiency of the traded stocks. Measuring the level of 
informational efficiency is possible assessing the randomness of returns.  Given the massive amount 
of stocks traded in the U.S. stock market, we choice to study only stocks that are part of the S&P 500 
Index.  
    The index was created in 1923 by Standard and Poor’s and covered at that time 233 companies3. 
The S&P 500 Index in its composition of 500 companies was introduced in 1957 and it is computed 
as it follows 
 Index level = 
∑ Pii * Qi
Divisor
 (1) 
where the numerator is the sum of the price of each stock in the index multiplied by the number of 
shares used in the index calculation, and the denominator is the “divisor”, a quantity used to consider 
particular events, such as spin-offs or structural changes, to avoid the alteration of the numerical value 
of the index4. This formula descents from a modified Laspeyres index and is a “base-weighted 
aggregative” method (Cowles, 1939) with the consequence that the index is weighted toward 
companies with large market capitalization. The number of the included companies and their 
importance for the U.S. market make the index a good indicator of the performance of the American 
stock market consenting us to have a good overview of the overall level of efficiency.  
    The survey covers the period from January 2, 2008 (first trading day) to July 24, 2018 and data are 
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4 Index Mathematics Methodology, available at https://us.spindices.com/documents/methodologies/methodology-index-
math.pdf. 
gathered on daily basis (trading days). However, we considered only the S&P 500 Index components 
that were continuously part of the index for the entire period, which is essential to generalize the 
results for all the stocks.  
    The S&P 500 Index consists of 505 components or stocks; using Thomson Reuters Eikon & 
Datastream and Wikipedia (which refers to Compustat database and the S&P website) we retraced 
the history of the S&P 500 from September 1989 (the oldest year available on Datastream) to July 
2018. Therefore, we eliminated from our analysis the components which were added, eliminated or 
substituted within the period, which leads us from 505 components to 305 components continuously 
traded from 2008 to 2018 as part of the S&P 500 Index. These 305 components were our target 
population.   
    We found out that, of the 305 components, the 11.48% are original stocks (35 stocks), in the sense 
that they were part of the original composition of the index in 19575. We obtain this information using 
the Appendix in Siegel’s book (2005), which reports the original S&P 500 Index firms. We 
considered only those firms that did not experience mergers, acquisitions or drastic changes in their 
original structure. Each stock is classified per GICS6 (Global Industry Classification Standard) 
taxonomy; as shown in Table 1, the composition of the index is dominated by financial corporations 
(17,70%), whereas telecommunication services and real estate corporations are the least represented 
(0.98% and 3.93% respectively). Interestingly, of the 35 survivor companies, no one possesses 
financial services as core activity, whereas from 2008-2018 most of the stocks are issued by financial 
companies with a growing component of companies involved in the information technology services.   
 
  
                                                          
5 We know that these 35 stocks have been continuously part of the index from September 1989 to July 2018, except for 
Macy’s. We were not able to reconstruct all their history because of the lack of data. 
6 They are classification standards published by MSCI in collaboration with Standard & Poor's to facilitate a globally 
homogenous criterion of classification. Companies are classified on the basis of their core business and inserted in one of 
the 11 provided categories.  
Table 1. Distribution of the S&P 500 Index components by GICS for the period 2008-2018 (from January 2, 2008 to July 
24, 2018). 
  GICS  Absolute Frequency Relative frequency (%)  
1 Consumer Discretionary 45 14.75% 
2 Consumer Staples 26 8.52% 
3 Energy 18 5.90% 
4 Financials 54 17.70% 
5 Health Care 34 11.15% 
6 Industrials 38 12.46% 
7 Information Technology 38 12.46% 
8 Materials 15 4.92% 
9 Real Estate 12 3.93% 
10 Telecommunication Services 3 0.98% 
11 Utilities 22 7.21% 
  Tot 305 100% 
Source: our elaboration based on Thomson Reuters Eikon & Datastream data. 
241 (79.02%) stocks of the 305 under analysis are traded on the NYSE (New York Stock Exchange), 
whereas the remaining 64 (20.98%) are traded on the NASDAQ.  
Given the impossibility of repeating all the tests for each of the 305 stocks, we extracted a sample 
from the 305 stocks, performed the desired tests and concluded if that stock is informationally 
efficient or not. Once we have repeated the procedure for all the sampled stocks, we obtained a 
proportion of the inefficient stocks in the S&P 500 Index and tried to generalize the results to the 
entire index via confidence intervals.   
3.2 The sampling scheme 
A crucial step is the determination of the sample size. We must note that the presented conclusions 
hold only for the stocks in the S&P 500 Index; as noted by Fama (1965b), the component companies 
of the main indexes are among the largest and most important in their fields, therefore they are not a 
random sample of stocks from the NYSE and the NASDAQ, so the empirical results will be strictly 
applicable only to the shares of large important companies. In his work, Fama selected all the stocks 
of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) at the time, but the choice seems to be based only on the 
convenience of dealing with a small set of stocks. Kendall (1953) used 22 price-series which were 
selected for the purpose of his study, without specifying how that number was determined. Jensen 
(1968) studied the performance of 115 open end mutual funds; the sample size chosen by the author 
is probably related to data availability.   
    Following Cochrane (1953), if the units are classified into two classes, C and C' (informationally 
efficient stocks and non-efficient stocks), given N large enough, a first approximation of the sample 
size is 
 n0 =
t2pq
d
2
 (2) 
where t is the abscissa of the normal curve which cuts off an area  at the tails (usually indicated in 
textbooks as z), d is the chosen degree of precision or margin of error in the estimated proportion p 
of units in class C, and q is the complementary of p, or (1-p). The ratio between t2 and d2 is the desired 
variance of the sample proportion. If n0/N is negligible, then n0 is a good approximation of the sample 
size; if not, the following formula can be used 
  n =
n0
1+
n0
N
 (3) 
A simpler formula and more suitable for our purposes can be derived from (2). The sample size 
formula adopted is (4) and is generally known as Yamane formula (1967a; 1967b) 
 n =
N
1+Nd
2
 (4) 
and its derivation is shown in Appendix A (Supplementary Material online) of the present work. The 
use of this formula is based on the following assumptions: the sample percentage p is assumed to be 
normally distributed, a confidence of 95% is assumed and p is set equal to 0.5.  
    The specification of the desired precision is a controversial task, Cochrane (1953) admitted that a 
certain level of arbitrary is involved in the survey design, and the final decision relies mostly on the 
purpose of the study. We think that a reasonable value is 0.1, which avoids a too large or too small 
sample size. Finally, the chosen sample size is approximately 75, which means that we will select 75 
stocks from the S&P 500 Index components in the period 2008-2018.   
    We stratified our sample to consider effects on the stocks’ performance due to the sector and the 
exchange market. The distinctions between stocks traded on the NYSE and the NASDAQ are very 
important. First, the NYSE is older and bigger in terms of market capitalization of the listed firms 
than the NASDAQ. Second, NYSE is an auction market where brokers purchase stocks on behalf of 
firms or clients. Trades are concluded between individuals on the floor of the exchange, whereas 
NADSDAQ is a computer-based market with orders processed electronically; this distinction can be 
important in our analysis concerning information efficiency. Finally, companies on the NYSE are 
perceived to be less volatile because its composition includes principally blue-chip companies, 
considered to be more stable and established.  
    There are two layers of stratification, the first one regarding the stock exchange (NYSE or 
NASDAQ) and the second one the sector of the stock. To consider a more parsimonious distribution 
of the stocks in the second stratus and avoid empty strata, we merge the 11 GICS categories into 5 
categories based on similarities. Table 2 synthesizes the second layer of stratification. The subsample 
size from each stratum is proportional to the size of the subpopulation in the stratum (proportional 
allocation); the sampling scheme is represented in Figure 1. For example, knowing that the Health 
Care sector weights the 11.62% of the stocks traded on the NYSE, we have that the subsample must 
be 59*0.1162 ≈ 7 (rounded to the nearest integer) to maintain the proportion and the 
representativeness in the sample. Using the same rationale for all the subsamples, we selected, 
randomly, 14 stocks traded on the NYSE issued by Consumer Discretionary and Staples companies, 
3 stocks traded on the NASDAQ issued by Consumer Discretionary and Staples companies and so 
on. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Distribution of the S&P 500 Index components by stock exchange and merged GICS categories for the period 
2008-2018 (weights in brackets).  
 GICS  Traded on NYSE Traded on Nasdaq Tot 
1 
Consumer Discretionary and 
Staples 
57 (23.65%) 14 (21.88%) 71 
2 
Energy, Industrials, Materials and 
Utilities 
87 (36.10%) 6 (9.38%) 93 
3 Financials and Real Estate 57 (23.65%) 9 (14.06%) 66 
4 Health Care 28 (11.62%) 6 (9.38%) 34 
5 
Information Technology and 
Telecommunication Services 
12 (4.98%) 29 (45.31%) 41 
 Tot 241 64 305 
Source: our elaboration on Thomson Reuters Eikon & Datastream data. 
 
Figure 1. The sampling scheme of the study using two strata: stock exchange (NYSE or NASDAQ) and GICS (five 
categories as showed in Table 2).  
 
Source: our elaboration. 
This stratification is just one of the possible, but it results resonable. For example, stratifying for 
market capitalization is not appropriate becuase several companies in a period of more than 10 years 
experienced a drammatic change in their capitalization; stratifying for original companies and new 
companies is not appropriate beacuse stocks can be removed and inserted several times in the index, 
besides, the low number of original companies would create empty strata.   
3.3 Definition of financial returns  
We gathered the time series of close prices of the selected stocks adjusted for all applicable splits and 
dividend distributions as proposed in Fama (1965b) using Yahoo! Finance data7. The period covered 
goes from December 31, 2007 to July 24, 2018 (included) for a total of 2660 observations. The tests 
are not performed on daily prices but on the first differences of their natural logarithms. We define 
this variable “financial return” or “log-return”  
 rt+1 = loge pt+1 – loge pt (5) 
where pt+l is the price of the security at the end of day t + 1, and pt is the price at the end of day t. 
This cause the loss of an observation; hence the log-returns series covers the period from January 2, 
2008 to July 24, 2018 (2659 observations).   
3.4 Runs test 
Runs test is a common methodology used to test the randomness in price changes (see, for example, 
Fama 1965b). A run can be defined as an unbroken sequence of similar events or like objects 
(Bradley, 1968). For example, in the series AABABBBAA there are five runs: one run of A's of 
length 1, two runs of A's of length 2, one run of B's of length 1 and one run of B's of length 3. If the 
outputs A and B are randomly distributed, we should not recognize any pattern in the series. The 
hypotheses are 
H0 : data are randomly distributed 
H1 : data are not randomly distributed. 
The test statistic is 
 𝑍 =
Observed no. runs - Expected no. runs
SD no. runs
  
where, given m events of the type 1 and n events of the type 2, and m + n = N 
 𝐸xpected no. runs = 
2nm
𝑁
+1  
and 
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 𝑆𝐷 no. runs = √
2𝑚𝑛(2𝑚𝑛 −  𝑁)
𝑁2(𝑁 − 1)
  
with SD the standard deviation of the number of runs. We reject the null hypothesis of randomness if 
the computed statistic, in modulus, is greater than the critical value (1.96 with the classical alpha of 
5%) or if p-value < significance level. We used this nonparametric test in two different ways. First, 
we wanted to test if it is not possible to obtain above average returns which implies informational 
efficiency for the analysed stock. We define 
 dt = {
1,  rt > μ
0,  rt ≤ μ
  
as the dichotomized series of log-returns. In this way we have obtained a sequence of runs (with 
symbols 1 and 0) and we can apply the test of randomness; if we reject the null hypothesis of 
randomness, we can conclude that above average returns are not randomly distributed and hence they 
can be predicted. Second, to compute the runs up and down for N numeric data values (log-returns), 
the sign of the difference between each value and the previous one is recorded and used to create a 
binary series of N – 1 signs, indicating with + a sequence of increasing returns and with – a sequence 
of decreasing returns. If we reject the null hypothesis, we can conclude that increases and decreases 
in the financial returns series are not random and hence they can be predicted.  
3.5 Variance ratio test 
The Lo and MacKinlay variance ratio test (1988) uses the fact that the variance of the increments of 
a random walk is linear in the observation interval. That is, given the random walk Xt, the variance of 
Xt – Xt – 2 is twice the variance of Xt – Xt – 1. Hence, if the natural logarithm of the stock price follows 
the random walk version of the martingale hypothesis, then the return variance should be proportional 
to the return horizon (Fong, Koh and Ouliaris, 1997; Chang and Ting, 2000). If we define Xt = lnPt, 
with Pt the price of a stock, under the martingale null hypothesis, the variance of the q-th holding-
period returns, Xt – Xt − q, should be q times the variance of the one-period returns, Xt – Xt – 1. The null 
hypothesis therefore implies that the variance ratio 
 V (q) = 
σ2(q)
σ2
 (6) 
is equal to 1, because the numerator is 1/q times the variance of the q-th period returns and the 
denominator is the variance of one-period returns (Fong, Koh and Ouliaris, 1997).  
Lo and MacKinlay (1988) derived a version of the specification test of the random walk model that 
is robust to changing variances (heteroskedasticity) given the growing consensus among financial 
economists, that volatilities of asset returns do change over time (Merton, 1980; Poterba and 
Summers, 1986; Bollerslev, Chou, and Kroner, 1992). This version of their test is robust to general 
forms of conditional heteroscedasticity, including ARCH processes and deterministic changes in the 
variance. The Lo and MacKinlay’s heteroscedasticity-robust standard normal test-statistics is 
indicated with z*(q); Lo and MacKinlay’s (1989) show that the asymptotic distribution of z*(q) 
performs well in finite samples, and the variance ratio test is more reliable than Dickey-Fuller and 
Box-Pierce tests. With this kind of tests, it is possible to uncover low-frequency variations in the data 
such as the presence of long memory or mean reversion (Fong, Koh and Ouliaris, 1997).  
    As noted by Fong, Koh and Ouliaris (1997), because the researcher has to examine variance ratios 
across all preselected lags, the null hypothesis is not rejected only if none of the variance ratio 
estimates are significantly different from 1. Since it is possible that some of the variance ratios 
estimates across different lags differ from 1, it is appropriate not only to focus on the significance of 
individual tests, but also control for the joint test size. To control the size of the joint test, Chow and 
Denning (1993) proposed a (conservative) test statistic that examines the maximum absolute value of 
a set of multiple variance ratio statistics. The p-value for the Chow-Denning statistic is bounded from 
above by the probability for the Studentized Maximum Modulus (SMM) distribution with parameter 
m and infinite degrees-of-freedom in order to approximate this bound with the asymptotic SMM 
distribution.  
 
 
3.7 Data analysis and results 
The tables in this section show the name of each randomly selected stock preceded by a label for each 
subsample, where NYSE and NASD are the abbreviation for the stock exchange and the numbers 
refer to the aggregated GICS category; so, for example, NASD2 indicates a stock traded on the 
NASDAQ issued by a company operating in the energy, industrials, materials or utilities sector.  
      To detect if above average returns and changes in the sign of returns behave as a random series 
we tested if the runs above and below the mean and the series of runs up and down are randomly 
distributed. This is an easy way to measure the level of informational efficiency of each stock since 
the more random data are, the more efficient and unpredictable the series. Table 3 shows the results 
for the two variations of the test. Asymptotic p-values are computed for runs above and below the 
mean, whereas for runs up and runs down the length of runs and what sequence of runs is significant 
(based on p-value) are reported. “Runs up” refers to a sequence of increasing returns such as -0.2, -
0.1, 0, 0.1, 0.2; “runs down” refers to a sequence of decreasing returns such as 0.2, 0.1, 0, -0.1, -0.2. 
If no change occurs at start of the series, the run is counted as an up; if no change occurs after an up, 
the runs is counted as an up; finally, if no change occurs after a down, the run is counted as a down. 
The length of runs up or down is the number of symbols in succession without interruptions. For 
example, for Best Buy the length of runs up goes from 1 to 5, which means that the sequence of sign 
recorded from the series are +, + +, + + +, + + + +, + + + + +, and with the 3** we indicate that the 
sequence of signs made by three ups is significantly (at 5%) non-random.  
    Even if the interpretation of the test for runs above and below the mean is straightforward, the 
interpretation of runs up and down is difficult: how many runs should be significant to consider the 
series non-random? We simulated 1,000 random series and performed the test to observe whether the 
results were similar to these outputs. For all the simulated random series the test of runs above and 
below the mean was almost always able to catch the random nature of data and only in few occasions 
it resulted significant: 6 times the test signalled, wrongly, significance at 1%, and in two of these 
cases also some runs up or down resulted significant (but no more than three sequences). The test of 
runs up and down failed with a higher frequency and in some simulations even 4 sequences were 
significant. We can therefore conclude that the test of runs above and below the mean is particularly 
reliable, especially when the significance is at 1%, whereas the test of runs up and down must be 
interpreted with prudence and conclude for the rejection of the null hypothesis if also the other test 
suggests the same or if there are more than 3 sequences of runs highly significant.    
    The evidence against non-randomness from our data is remarkable. The test over runs above and 
below the mean shows strong evidence against randomness in the series of TJX, Bank of New York 
Mellon, Loews, U.S. Bancorp, Huntington Bancshares and Fiserv. Interesting results concerning the 
analysis of runs up and down characterize the series of Occidental Petroleum, Southwest Airlines, 
Waste Management and Franklin Resources, where numerous runs sequences are highly significant 
indicating non-randomness. The results of the two versions of the test are in some cases concordant 
(for example, Fiserv and Southwest Airlines), in other cases they reach different conclusions. It is the 
case of Cintas (there is no evidence of randomness if we use runs up and runs down, whereas strong 
evidence results from the analysis of runs above and below the mean) or Waste Management (the 
opposite case). However, as pointed out by Fama (1965b), the runs tests are rigid in their approach in 
determining the duration of upward and downward movements in prices; indeed, a run is terminated 
whenever there is a change in sign in the sequence of price changes, regardless of the size of the price 
change that causes the change in sign. The test over runs above and below the mean presents also two 
limits: it is dependent on the temporal interval under analysis since the mean is computed over the 
whole interval, with the consequence that shorter or larger interval of time could provide completely 
different conclusions; the mean of financial returns can also be negative, indicating a loss. When the 
mean is negative, from the point of view of an investor, it is of little interest to know that it is possible 
to obtain above average returns, because also irrelevant returns are higher than a loss. Fortunately, 
the use of stocks included in an important index such as the S&P 500 reduces the cases of negative 
means. Both the tests considering the S&P 500 Index returns series suggest non-randomness.  
Table 3. Runs test above and below the mean for the dichotomized series of returns (symbols: 1 and 0) and runs up and 
down for changes in the sign of subsequent returns (symbols: + and −); ns stands for “not significant”. The results of the 
tests are obtained via the spreadsheet provided by Dr. Martin Sewell. 
    
Runs above and 
below the mean 
Runs up Runs down 
  Stock 
Asymptotic p-
value 
Lenght Significant  Lenght Significant  
NYSE1 Best Buy 0.9363 1-5 3** 1-5 ns 
NYSE1 Campbell Soup 0.0265** 1-5 4* 1-5 ns 
NYSE1 Carnival 0.1098 1-6 ns 1-6 6*** 
NYSE1 Clorox 0.0217** 1-5 ns 1-5 2** 
NYSE1 Constellation Brands A 0.8578 1-5 4* 1-2-3-4-5-7 5**-7*** 
NYSE1 General Mills 0.0163** 1-5 3** 1-6 ns 
NYSE1 Kroger 0.2349 1-5 ns 1-7 7*** 
NYSE1 Newell Brands 0.1265 1-5 ns 1-6 ns 
NYSE1 Nordstrom 0.4660 1-4 2*-5* 1-5 ns 
NYSE1 Sysco 0.0820* 1-5 ns 1-5 4** 
NYSE1 TJX < 0.0001*** 1-4 5* 1-5 ns 
NYSE1 Walmart 0.0152** 1-5 ns 1-5 ns 
NYSE1 Walt Disney 0.4259 1-5 2** 1-5 ns 
NYSE1 Yum! Brands 0.0267** 1-5 2**-4** 1-5 ns 
NYSE2 MMM 0.0688* 1-6 6** 1-5 ns 
NYSE2 AES 0.0472** 1-6 1*-3* 1-6 ns 
NYSE2 
American Electric 
Power 
0.0741* 1-5 ns 1-5 ns 
NYSE2 Cummins 0.1932 1-6 ns 1-2-3-4-5-7 4*-7*** 
NYSE2 Eaton 0.8919 1-6 6** 1-5 3*** 
NYSE2 Exelon 0.0729* 1-5 ns 1-5 ns 
NYSE2 Exxon Mobil 0.0055*** 1-6 3*-4* 1-5 ns 
NYSE2 FirstEnergy 0.4486 1-2-3-4-5-7 7*** 1-5 ns 
NYSE2 General Dynamics 0.0164** 1-5 ns 1-6 ns 
NYSE2 Hess 0.9226 1-6 ns 1-5 ns 
NYSE2 L3 Technologies 0.9664 1-5 ns 1-6 2* 
NYSE2 Nisource 0.4388 1-2-3-4-5-8 3**-8*** 1-5 2* 
NYSE2 Noble Energy 0.0345** 1-6 ns 1-5 2** 
NYSE2 Occidental Petroleum 0.2645 1-6 4*-5*** 1-5 2**-4* 
NYSE2 Parker-Hannifin 0.3203 1-5 ns 1-6 3** 
NYSE2 Pinnacle West Capital 0.7153 1-6 ns 1-5 ns 
NYSE2 Schlumberger 0.4968 1-5 ns 1-6 ns 
NYSE2 Southwest Airlines 0.0036*** 1-5 1**-3** 1-5 1**-2*-5** 
NYSE2 Textron 0.0509* 1-5 1**-2** 1-5 5*** 
NYSE2 Vulcan Materials 0.8005 1-5 ns 1-6 ns 
NYSE2 Waste Management 0.6857 1-5 1*-3** 1-6 1*-2**-3* 
NYSE3 
AvalonBay 
Communities 
0.0738* 1-5 1* 1-5 ns 
NYSE3 Bank of NY Mellon < 0.0001*** 1-6 ns 1-5 5** 
NYSE3 Boston Properties 0.0045*** 1-5 2*-3** 1-6 ns 
NYSE3 Charles Schwab 0.0016*** 1-4 5* 1-5 3** 
 
 
 
     
Table 3. Continued 
    
Runs above and 
below the mean 
Runs up Runs down   
  Stock 
Asymptotic p-
value 
Lenght Significant  Lenght Significant  
NYSE3 Franklin Resources 0.0021*** 1-6 2**-3*** 1-5 1**-2* 
NYSE3 Loews < 0.0001*** 1-5 1**-3**-4* 1-5 ns 
NYSE3 Moody's 0.0059*** 1-6 ns 1-2-3-4-5-7 7*** 
NYSE3 Morgan Stanley 0.1254 1-2-3-4-5-7 7*** 1-7 7*** 
NYSE3 Prudential Financial 0.0156** 1-5 ns 1-6 6** 
NYSE3 State Street 0.0001*** 1-5 3** 1-5 ns 
NYSE3 U.S. Bancorp < 0.0001*** 1-6 4* 1-5 ns 
NYSE3 Western Union 0.0011*** 1-5 1** 1-5 ns 
NYSE3 Weyerhaeuser 0.2587 1-5 ns 1-2-3-4-5-7 7*** 
NYSE4 Aetna 0.0495** 1-5 ns 1-2-3-4-5-7 7*** 
NYSE4 Anthem 0.0712* 1-6 5* 1-2-3-4-5-7 7*** 
NYSE4 Baxter International 0.0710* 1-4 2**-5* 1-6 ns 
NYSE4 Eli Lilly 0.1002 1-5 ns 1-5 ns 
NYSE4 Johnson&Johnson 0.0527* 1-5 4* 1-5 ns 
NYSE4 Waters 0.0537* 1-6 3** 1-5 ns 
NYSE4 
Zimmer Biomet 
Holdings 
0.1948 1-5 3* 1-5 5*** 
NYSE5 HP 0.6275 1-5 ns 1-6 6** 
NYSE5 Juniper Networks 0.0754* 1-5 3*** 1-5 2**-3**-4* 
NYSE5 Oracle 0.0030*** 1-5 1**-2** 1-5 ns 
NASD1 Costco Wholesale 0.9766 1-2-3-4-5-7 7*** 1-6 1*-4** 
NASD1 Hasbro 0.8950 1-4 3*-5* 1-2-3-4-5-7 3**-4*-7** 
NASD1 PepsiCo 0.5468 1-5 ns 1-5 ns 
NASD2 Cintas 0.0033*** 1-5 ns 1-5 ns 
NASD2 Paccar 0.0088*** 1-5 ns 1-5 ns 
NASD3 Huntington Bancshares < 0.0001*** 1-5 ns 1-5 5** 
NASD3 Zions 0.4116 1-5 4** 1-5 ns 
NASD4 Biogen 0.0009*** 1-6 ns 1-5 ns 
NASD4 Mylan 0.7397 1-6 ns 1-5 ns 
NASD5 Akamai Technologies 0.1781 1-5 1**-2* 1-5 ns 
NASD5 Analog Devices 0.0189** 1-5 ns 1-6 2** 
NASD5 Apple 0.4959 1-5 3* 1-6 3**-5*** 
NASD5 Citrix System 0.0360** 1-5 1* 1-6 4** 
NASD5 Fiserv < 0.0001*** 1-5 1**-3** 1-5 3*-4* 
NASD5 Microsoft 0.0046*** 1-4 5* 1-5 4** 
NASD5 Symantec 0.0100** 1-5 ns 1-5 ns 
  S&P 500 0.0010*** 1-5 3*-4* 1-2-3-4-5-7 3**-7*** 
Note: * stands for significance at 10%, ** stands for significance at 5%, *** stands for significance at 1%. 
    
    The variance ratio test seems to confirm the presence of severe inefficiency in the selected sample 
and in the S&P 500 index series (Table 4). We select the periods proposed originally by Lo and 
MacKinley (1988). The null hypothesis of a martingale is strongly rejected, for both individual tests 
and joint tests, for Clorox, TJX, Walmart, Yum! Brands, Exxon Mobil, AvalonBay Communities, 
Bank of New York Mellon, Boston Properties, Charles Schwab, Franklin Resources, Loews, Oracle, 
Hasbro, Biogen, Analog Devices, Citrix System, Microsoft, Symantec and for the S&P 500 index 
series. For these stocks the rejection of the individual tests it is at 5% for almost every period and for 
the joint test. These results are in line with the findings of other studies that implemented the same 
methodology (Lo and MacKinley, 1988; Chang and Ting, 2000). However, it should be noted that Lo 
and MacKinley used weekly data to minimize potential biases of daily observations associated with 
nontrading, the bid-ask spread, asynchronous prices, etc. Even if this is true, in our case the choice of 
daily observations is appropriate because the sampling theory of the test is based wholly on 
asymptotic approximations, therefore a large number of observations is needed. Furthermore, we can 
confront these results with other tests to see whether they converge on the same conclusion or not.  
    Lo and MacKinley (1988) concluded that the evidence given by the variance ratio test shows that 
weekly stock returns are incompatible with the random walk model; our findings show that also daily 
stock returns are incompatible with the model. However, the rejections of the hypothesis do not offer 
any explicit suggestion toward a more plausible model for the data. Lo and MacKinley suggested 
possible alternative models: for example, a popular hypothesis is that the stock returns process may 
be described by the sum of a random walk and a stationary mean-reverting component, as in Summers 
(1986) and in Fama and French (1988), or only by a mean-reverting process (the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck 
process) as in Shiller and Perron (1985). The authors clarify that the rejection of the null hypothesis 
does “not necessarily imply that the stock market is inefficient or that prices are not rational 
assessments of "fundamental" values. [...] without a more explicit economic model of the price-
generating mechanism, a rejection of the random walk hypothesis has few implications for the 
efficiency of market price formation” (Lo and MacKinley, 1988, p. 42). However, the test may be 
interpreted as a rejection of some economic model of price efficiency, and our approach has the 
advantage of comparing these results with those derived from different methodologies. 
 
Table 4. Variance ratio tests (with unbiased variances) of the random walk hypothesis for the sample. The variance ratios 
of returns are reported with the heteroscedasticity-robust test statistics z*(q) given in parentheses. Under the random walk 
null hypothesis, the value of the variance ratio is 1 and the test statistics have a standard normal distribution 
(asymptotically). For the joint tests the max |z| statistics is reported and in parentheses the period for which it assumes its 
maximum is indicated; the p-value for the joint tests is computed via approximation using Studentized Maximum Modulus 
with parameter 4 and infinite degree of freedom.  
    Individual tests   
  Stock Period 2 Period 4 Period 8 Period 16 Joint test  
NYSE1 Best Buy 0.998 (-0.08) 0.975 (-0.49) 0.968 (-0.43) 1.008 (0.08) 0.49 (4) 
NYSE1 Campbell Soup 0.985 (-0.52) 0.932 (-1.31) 0.925 (-0.95) 0.957 (-0.37) 1.31 (4) 
NYSE1 Carnival 0.974 (-0.90) 0.881 (-2.15)** 0.840 (-1.77)* 0.811 (-1.42) 2.15 (4) 
NYSE1 Clorox 0.907 (-2.78)*** 0.837 (-2.75)*** 0.770 (-2.63)*** 0.744 (-2.10)** 2.79 (2)** 
NYSE1 Constellation Brands A 0.987 (-0.49) 0.963 (-0.75) 0.935 (-0.82) 0.947 (-0.43) 0.82 (8) 
NYSE1 General Mills 0.967 (-1.30) 0.888 (-2.20)** 0.795 (-2.52)** 0.733 (-2.29)** 2.52 (8)** 
NYSE1 Kroger 0.972 (-0.71) 0.942 (-0.92) 0.907 (-1.09) 0.867 (-1.19) 1.19 (16) 
NYSE1 Newell Brands 0.989 (-0.33) 0.976 (-0.40) 0.984 (-0.18) 0.974 (-0.19) 0.40 (4) 
NYSE1 Nordstrom 1.039 (1.28) 1.002 (0.03) 0.950 (-0.51) 0.967 (-0.23) 1.28 (2) 
NYSE1 Sysco 0.927** (-2.10) 0.874 (-2.05)** 0.850 (-1.61) 0.829 (-1.27) 2.10 (2) 
NYSE1 TJX 0.923 (-2.93)*** 0.832 (-3.21)*** 0.683 (-3.68)*** 0.631 (-2.84)*** 3.68 (8)*** 
NYSE1 Walmart 0.921 (-2.46)** 0.826 (-2.98)*** 0.726 (-3.12)*** 0.729 (-2.12)** 3.12 (8)*** 
NYSE1 Walt Disney 0.945 (-1.63) 0.878 (-1.83)* 0.825 (-1.63) 0.800 (-1.24) 1.83 (4) 
NYSE1 Yum! Brands 0.953 (-1.78)* 0.836 (-3.26)*** 0.745 (-3.17)*** 0.698 (-2.50)** 3.26 (4)*** 
NYSE2 MMM 0.934 (-2.24)** 0.870 (-2.22)** 0.822 (-1.88)* 0.779 (-1.58) 2.24 (2)* 
NYSE2 AES 0.901 (-2.32)** 0.805 (-2.46)** 0.740 (-2.12)** 0.683 (-1.76)* 2.46 (4)* 
NYSE2 
American Electric 
Power 
0.915 (-2.12)** 0.830 (-2.21)** 0.798 (-1.69)* 0.727 (-1.57) 2.21 (4) 
NYSE2 Cummins 0.959 (-1.19) 0.897 (-1.55) 0.837 (-1.54) 0.826 (-1.11) 1.55 (4) 
NYSE2 Eaton 0.992 (-0.31) 0.986 (-0.29) 0.979 (-0.25) 1.006 (0.05) 0.31 (2) 
NYSE2 Exelon 0.926 (-1.97)** 0.865 (-1.86)* 0.812 (-1.64) 0.736 (-1.52) 1.97 (2) 
NYSE2 Exxon Mobil 0.869 (-2.54)** 0.727 (-2.67)*** 0.640 (-2,23)** 0.563 (-1.91)* 2.67 (4)** 
NYSE2 FirstEnergy 0.918 (-2.13)** 0.854 (-1.97)** 0.871 (-1.13) 0.857 (-0.86) 2.13 (2) 
NYSE2 General Dynamics 0.948 (-1.77)* 0.967 (-0.583) 1.032 (0.36) 1.112 (0.83) 1.77 (2) 
NYSE2 Hess 0.970 (-0.87) 0.907 (-1.37) 0.842 (-1.43) 0.809 (-1.15) 1.43 (8) 
NYSE2 L3 Technologies 0.947 (-1.59) 0.964 (-0.59) 0.988 (-0.13) 1.003 (0.02) 1.59 (2) 
NYSE2 Nisource 0.958 (-1.25) 0.904 (-1.52) 0.810 (-1.89)* 0.731 (-1.82)* 1.89 (8) 
NYSE2 Noble Energy 0.957 (-1.06) 0.898 (-1.35) 0.835 (-1.39) 0.746 (-1.47) 1.47 (16) 
NYSE2 Occidental Petroleum 0.922 (-1.96)** 0.833 (-2.13)** 0.759 (-1.88)* 0.664 (-1.74)* 2.13 (4) 
NYSE2 Parker-Hannifin 0.975 (-0.83) 0.945 (-0.96) 0.908 (-1.01) 0.906 (-0.71) 1.01 (8) 
NYSE2 Pinnacle West Capital 0.965 (-1.01) 0.924 (-1.18) 0.913 (-0.85) 0.915 (-0.56) 1.18 (4) 
NYSE2 Schlumberger 0.935 (-1.88)* 0.880 (-1.87)* 0.838 (-1.57) 0.796 (-1.31) 1.88 (2) 
NYSE2 Southwest Airlines 0.913 (-2.41)** 0.916 (-1.35) 0.912 (-0.98) 0.956 (-0.35) 2.41 (2) 
NYSE2 Textron 0.987 (-0.35) 1.014 (0.20) 1.075 (0.63) 1.111 (0.60) 0.63 (8) 
NYSE2 Vulcan Materials 1.040 (1.28) 0.993 (-0.13) 0.961 (-0.43) 0.926 (-0.57) 1.28 (2) 
NYSE2 Waste Management 0.966 (-0.88) 0.876 (-1.74)* 0.789 (-1.93)* 0.756 (-1.51) 1.93 (8) 
NYSE3 
AvalonBay 
Communities 
0.810 (-4.11)*** 0.677 (-3.85)*** 0.566 (-3.25)*** 0.524 (-2.37)** 4.11 (2)*** 
NYSE3 Bank of NY Mellon 0.822 (-3.01)*** 0.696 (-2.99)*** 0.561 (-2.89)*** 0.461 (-2.44)** 3.01 (2)** 
NYSE3 Boston Properties 0.787 (-4.69)*** 0.661 (-4.00)*** 0.552 (-3.28)*** 0.511 (-2.39)** 4.69 (2)*** 
NYSE3 Charles Schwab 0.883 (-3.23)*** 0.796 (-3.13)*** 0.660 (-3.37)*** 0.629 (-2.48)** 3.37 (8)*** 
NYSE3 Equifax 0.983 (-0.48) 0.964 (-0.53) 0.932 (-0.63) 0.885 (-0.75) 0.75 (16) 
NYSE3 Franklin Resources 0.926 (-2.15)** 0.835 (-2.52)** 0.786 (-2.02)** 0.741 (-1.60) 2.52 (4)** 
NYSE3 Loews 0.853 (-2.76)*** 0.767 (-2.29)** 0.650 (-2.12)** 0.552 (-1.82)* 2.76 (2)** 
NYSE3 Moody's 0.993 (-0.19) 0.960 (-0.57) 0.881 (-1.11) 0.826 (-1.11) 1.11 (8) 
 
 
 
     
Table 4. Continued 
  Stock Period 2 Period 4 Period 8 Period 16 Joint test  
NYSE3 Morgan Stanley 1.005 (0.07) 0.896 (-0.74) 0.691 (-1.52) 0.589 (-1.55) 1.55 (16) 
NYSE3 Prudential Financial 0.975 (-0.51) 0.904 (-0.97) 0.851 (-0.95) 0.826 (-0.75) 0.97 (4) 
NYSE3 State Street 0.883 (-1.97)** 0.750 (-2.17)** 0.646 (-2.07)** 0.533 (-1.94)* 2.17 (4) 
NYSE3 U.S. Bancorp 0.910 (-1.87)* 0.874 (-1.35) 0.718 (-1.91)* 0.630 (-1.70)* 1.91 (8) 
NYSE3 Western Union 0.924 (-1.92)* 0.885 (-1.73)* 0.834 (-1.60) 0.824 (-1.15) 1.92 (2) 
NYSE3 Weyerhaeuser 1.014 (0.525) 0.973 (-0.52) 0.898 (-1.32) 0.854 (-1.24) 1.32 (8) 
NYSE4 Aetna 0.951 (-1.41) 0.905 (-1.34) 0.895 (-0.95) 0.910 (-0.57) 1.41 (2) 
NYSE4 Anthem 0.999 (-0.04) 0.991 (-0.17) 1.011 (0.13) 1.011 (0.09) 0.17 (4) 
NYSE4 Baxter International 1.004 (0.11) 0.953 (-0.79) 0.894 (-1.23) 0.874 (-1.05) 1.23 (8) 
NYSE4 Eli Lilly 0.909 (-2.43)** 0.844 (-2.10)** 0.885 (-0.99) 0.846 (-0.93) 2.43 (2)* 
NYSE4 Johnson&Johnson 0.926 (-1.99)** 0.845 (-2.05)** 0.819 (-1.54) 0.789 (-1.27) 2.05 (4) 
NYSE4 Waters 0.983 (-0.50) 0.926 (-1.19) 0.870 (-1.38) 0.784 (-1.60) 1.60 (16) 
NYSE4 
Zimmer Biomet 
Holdings 
1.017 (0.55) 1.005 (0.09) 0.953 (-0.50) 0.958 (-0.30) 0.55 (2) 
NYSE5 HP 1.005 (0.16) 0.963 (-0.58) 0.882 (-1.17) 0.845 (-1.05) 1.17 (8) 
NYSE5 Juniper Networks 0.954 (-1.69)* 0.903 (-1.97)** 0.866 (-1.73)* 0.864 (-1.16) 1.97 (4) 
NYSE5 Oracle 0.914 (-2.85)*** 0.862 (-2.42)** 0.811 (-2.13)** 0.742 (-1.95)* 2.85 (2)** 
NASD1 Costco Wholesale 0.966 (-1.12) 0.914 (-1.48) 0.830 (-1.84)* 0.817 (-1.37) 1.84 (8) 
NASD1 Hasbro 0.942 (-2.23)** 0.872 (-2.63)*** 0.822 (-2.34)** 0.790 (-1.88)* 2.63 (4)** 
NASD1 PepsiCo 0.953 (-1.01) 0.905 (-1.17) 0.853 (-1.21) 0.830 (-1.01) 1.21 (8) 
NASD2 Cintas 0.953 (-1.66)* 0.932 (-1.25) 0.880 (-1.37) 0.838 (-1.24) 1.66 (2) 
NASD2 Paccar 0.953 (-1.56) 0.887 (-1.98)** 0.809 (-2.02)** 0.778 (-1.52) 2.02 (8) 
NASD3 Huntington Bancshares 0.927 (-1.20) 0.856 (-1.28) 0.717 (-1.65)* 0.741 (-1.04) 1.65 (8) 
NASD3 Zions 0.985 (-0.36) 0.912 (-1.09) 0.842 (-1.25) 0.774 (-1.21) 1.25 (8) 
NASD4 Biogen 0.961 (-1.73)* 0.891 (-2.57)** 0.880 (-1.86)* 0.807 (-2.03)** 2.57 (4)** 
NASD4 Mylan 1.042 (1.44) 1.059 (0.95) 0.999 (-0.01) 0.931 (-0.48) 1.44 (2) 
NASD5 Akamai Technologies 0.981 (-0.79) 0.949 (-1.14) 0.892 (-1.54) 0.851 (-1.44) 1.54 (8) 
NASD5 Analog Devices 0.933 (-2.54)** 0.863 (-2.69)*** 0.817 (-2.32)** 0.749 (-2.15)** 2.69 (4)** 
NASD5 Apple 0.999 (-0.03) 0.979 (-0.36) 1.016 (0.18) 1.042 (0.30) 0.36 (4) 
NASD5 Citrix System 0.913 (-3.30)*** 0.853 (-2.95)*** 0.821 (-2.25)** 0.761 (-2.02)** 3.30 (2)*** 
NASD5 Fiserv 0.923 (-1.88)* 0.885 (-1.57) 0.817 (-1.63) 0.781 (-1.33) 1.88 (2) 
NASD5 Microsoft 0.930 (-2.13)** 0.851 (-2.48)** 0.737 (-2.82)*** 0.666 (-2.43)** 2.82 (8)** 
NASD5 Symantec 0.912 (-2.28)** 0.808 (-2.87)*** 0.774 (-2.43)** 0.780 (-1.78)* 2.87 (4)** 
  S&P 500 0.902 (-2.59)*** 0.809 (-2.48)** 0.733 (-2.14)** 0.690 (-1.65)* 2.59 (2)** 
Note: * stands for significance at 10%, ** stands for significance at 5%, *** stands for significance at 1%.  
 
     Finally, we can compare all the results to conclude whether a stock is efficient or not. At this point, 
unfortunately, a certain degree of subjectivity must be introduced, however, the null hypothesis of 
informational efficiency of a stock will be rejected only when the evidence is strongly against it. 
Table 5 synthesizes the results of the various statistical tests performed, to assess whether the selected 
stocks follow a random walk. Runs tests and variance ratio tests give us an answer about the 
randomness of financial returns series. The answer “No” means that the series is non-random and 
therefore the random walk hypothesis should be rejected. Given the results of our simulations, we 
considered inefficient, stocks for which the runs above and below the mean was significant at 1%, or 
at 5% but with some runs up or down sequence significant. The only exception to this rule is Juniper 
Networks: in this case the runs above and below the mean test is significant only at 10% but that are 
4 significant sequence of runs up and down, three of which significant at 5%. For the variance ratio 
individual tests, we rejected the null hypothesis when one or more individual tests were significant at 
5%. The global result of these tests is given by the aggregation of runs tests and variance ratio tests 
(individual and joint): we conclude that a stock is inefficient only if all the three tests reject the null 
hypothesis of a random walk series (a very conservative, yet prudent, choice).   
    From the last column of Table 5 it results that the 18.6% of the selected stocks traded on the NYSE 
is inefficient, whereas the 25% of the selected stocks traded on the NASDAQ is inefficient. The fact 
that the NASDAQ is a computer-based market with orders processed electronically and that stocks 
on the NASDAQ are considered to be more volatile and growth oriented could explain the higher 
level of inefficiency. The most inefficient stratus of the sample was the financial and real estate sector 
of stocks traded on the NYSE, with the 35.7% of stocks inefficient (5 stocks over 14). Once again, 
the explanation may be linked with the volatility of this sector and to the great amount of information 
needed to successfully invest.  
    Table 6 shows the computed confidence intervals for proportion. The higher level of inefficiency 
is given by the individual variance ratio tests: the proportion, with a confidence of 95%, of inefficient 
stocks continuously traded as S&P 500 Index components from Jan 2, 2008 to July 24, 2018 is 
estimated to be between the 34.23% and the 53.77%. The range given using runs tests is also 
remarkable, whereas the variance ratio joint test is the most conservative methodology. Once we 
gathered all the results, we estimated a confidence interval for the proportion of inefficient stocks 
with a lower limit of 12.13% and an upper limit of 27.87%. This range is calculated considering 
inefficient stocks as signalled by both the runs test and the variance ratio test, therefore the empirical 
evidence supporting this result is very strong. This proofs that a certain degree of informational 
inefficiency exists in the U.S. stock market.  
 
Table 5. Summary of the statistical tests. The columns report a “Yes” if the financial returns series is informationally 
efficient (it follows a random walk), a “No” otherwise. The column “Global result” is given by the aggregation of runs 
tests and variance ratio tests: stocks are considered inefficient only if the performed tests converge on the same conclusion.         
      Variance Ratio   
  Stock Runs test Individual Tests Joint Test Global result 
NYSE1 Best Buy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE1 Campbell Soup No Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE1 Carnival Yes No Yes Yes 
NYSE1 Clorox No No No No 
NYSE1 Constellation Brands A Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE1 General Mills No No No No 
NYSE1 Kroger Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE1 Newell Brands Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE1 Nordstrom Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE1 Sysco Yes No Yes Yes 
NYSE1 TJX No No No No 
NYSE1 Walmart Yes No No Yes 
NYSE1 Walt Disney Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE1 Yum! Brands No No No No 
NYSE2 MMM Yes No Yes Yes 
NYSE2 AES No No Yes Yes 
NYSE2 
American Electric 
Power Yes No Yes 
Yes 
NYSE2 Cummins Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE2 Eaton Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE2 Exelon Yes No Yes Yes 
NYSE2 Exxon Mobil No No No No 
NYSE2 FirstEnergy Yes No Yes Yes 
NYSE2 General Dynamics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE2 Hess Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE2 L3 Technologies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE2 Nisource Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE2 Noble Energy No Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE2 Occidental Petroleum Yes No Yes Yes 
NYSE2 Parker-Hannifin Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE2 Pinnacle West Capital Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE2 Schlumberger Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE2 Southwest Airlines No No Yes Yes 
NYSE2 Textron Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE2 Vulcan Materials Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE2 Waste Management Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE3 
AvalonBay 
Communities Yes No No 
Yes 
NYSE3 Bank of NY Mellon No No No No 
NYSE3 Boston Properties No No No No 
NYSE3 Charles Schwab No No No No 
NYSE3 Equifax Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE3 Franklin Resources No No No No 
NYSE3 Loews No No No No 
NYSE3 Moody's No Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
Table 5. Continued 
      Variance Ratio   
  Stock 
Runs test 
(returns) 
Individual Tests 
(returns) 
Joint Test 
(returns) 
Global result 
(returns) 
NYSE3 Morgan Stanley Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE3 Prudential Financial No Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE3 State Street No No Yes Yes 
NYSE3 U.S. Bancorp No Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE3 Western Union No Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE3 Weyerhaeuser Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE4 Aetna No Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE4 Anthem Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE4 Baxter International Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE4 Eli Lilly Yes No Yes Yes 
NYSE4 Johnson&Johnson Yes No Yes Yes 
NYSE4 Waters Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE4 
Zimmer Biomet 
Holdings Yes Yes Yes 
Yes 
NYSE5 HP Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NYSE5 Juniper Networks No No Yes Yes 
NYSE5 Oracle No No No No 
NASD1 Costco Wholesale Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NASD1 Hasbro Yes No No Yes 
NASD1 PepsiCo Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NASD2 Cintas No Yes Yes Yes 
NASD2 Paccar No No Yes Yes 
NASD3 Huntington Bancshares No Yes Yes Yes 
NASD3 Zions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NASD4 Biogen No No No No 
NASD4 Mylan Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NASD5 Akamai Technologies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NASD5 Analog Devices No No No No 
NASD5 Apple Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NASD5 Citrix System No No No No 
NASD5 Fiserv No Yes Yes Yes 
NASD5 Microsoft No No No No 
NASD5 Symantec Yes No No Yes 
  S&P 500 No No No No 
 Tot. Inefficient Stocks  30 33 19 15 
     
Table 6. Confidence intervals for the proportion (with finite population correction) of inefficient S&P 500 stocks in the 
period 2008-2018. The confidence level is 95%.  
Confidence interval using Runs tests 
Confidence interval using Individual Variance 
Ratio tests 
[30.36%; 49.64%] [34.23%; 53.77%] 
Confidence interval using Joint Variance 
Ratio Tests 
Confidence interval using all the tests 
[16.77%; 33.89%] [12.13%; 27.87%] 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this work we tried to further validate the claim of inefficiencies in financial markets investigating 
the degree of informational efficiency combining classical techniques with a novel methodology. We 
selected a sample of stocks continuously traded as components of the S&P 500 Index from January 
2, 2008 to July 24, 2018 and via the use of runs tests and variance ratio tests we estimated the 
proportion of inefficient stocks in the index to be between the 12.13% and the 27.87%. These findings 
are in line with the works of many authors (for example, see: LeRoy and Porter, 1981; De Bondt and 
Thaler, 1987; Lo and MacKinlay, 1988) and provide new evidence regarding the existence of a certain 
degree of inefficiency in financial markets. This evidence should not be interpreted as an invite to 
challenge arrogantly the market, but rather as further proof that markets are made by humans, 
therefore they are not flawless. Of course, if you have to decide to who you should entrust your 
savings, we think that an analyst will make a better job than a blindfolded monkey. In the eternal fight 
between analysts and markets, however, we cannot still declare a winner: even though market has 
won most of the battles, the war is still open.  
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Supplementary Material for the paper “Blindfolded monkeys or financial 
analysts: who is worth your money?” 
Appendix A 
We show how to derive Yamane sample size formula (4) in the paper from equation (2) using Tejada and 
Punzalan (2012)8 approach and Cochrane (1953) notation. Remembering that 
 n0= 
t2pq
d2
 (2) 
 n =
n0
1+
n0
N
 (3) 
we assume a 95% degree of confidence so that t is approximately equal to 2. Because we have not any prior 
knowledge about P (the quantity which we would like to measure), the conservative approach suggests 
maximizing 
 𝑝(1 − 𝑝) =
1
4
− (
1
2
− 𝑝)
2
  
that assumes its maximum when p = 0.5, so that the subtrahend is equal to zero.  
Substituting this value in (2) 
 𝑛0 =  
220.5(1 − 0.5)
𝑑2
=
1
𝑑2
 (2a) 
substituting (2a) in (3) gives 
 𝑛 =  
1
𝑑2
1 +
1
𝑑2
𝑁
=
𝑁
1 + 𝑁𝑑2
 (4) 
this completes the proof.    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Tejada, J. J. and Punzalan, J. R. B. (2012). “On the Misuse of Slovin’s Formula”, The Philippine 
Statistician, 61 (1), pp. 129-136. 
